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Abstract
The U.S. first sale doctrine guarantees the right to resell purchased, copyrighted, durables, but does
not apply, for all intents and purposes, to information goods when they are distributed via digital
download. iTunes and the Kindle store are just two of many examples showing that information good
industries are moving towards a digital download distribution model. Because information goods
are perfectly durable, exhibit owner-specific depreciation, and have zero marginal cost, firms prefer
to curtail resale. The impact on consumers is ambiguous. The effect of prohibiting resale is analyzed
empirically in the context of video games. First, using a novel dataset including new and used game
sales, demand parameters are estimated using a dynamic structural model. Simulations can then be
used to determine the impact of shutting down resale markets.
Keywords Information Goods, Second-Hand Goods, Resale Markets
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1 Introduction
The first-sale doctrine1 (17 U.S.C. section 109) gives owners of legally acquired unaltered durable goods the right to
resell them. This exception to copyright protection is designed to benefit consumers, favoring property rights, free
trade, and access after production ceases over further rights to copyright holders.2 The first-sale doctrine, though, has
not kept up with technological advances. Because it only applies to the original copy, for all intents and purposes it
does not apply to downloaded goods. The reason is well-stated in Long (2008):
". . . a person who buys the latest blockbuster film on DVD may resell the disc at his pleasure, but if
he purchased that same film online he may not resell the file containing the movie unless he wishes to sell
the whole hard drive . . . which contains the file - an impractical choice to say the least."
Any method of transfer other than transferring the hard drive that the good was initially downloaded to involves making
and selling a copy of the original, and is illegal and can be prevented through access control measures.3 Hence, firms
can effectively eliminate information goods’ resale markets by distributing such products solely through downloads.
Each of the four most familiar information goods industries, books, video-games, movies, and music, which together
yield annual sales of around $90 billion in the US,4 are moving towards a download distribution model. For example,
one can buy books on a Kindle or iPad, download mainstream video games through Direct2Drive or the PlayStation
Network, download games to an iPhone, download movies and TV shows through Apple TV, or buy music through
iTunes. Distribution via download could increase total welfare, because marginal productions costs are lowered to
near-zero with digital distribution. But, it also allows firms to curtail resale, which could reduce consumer welfare
and total welfare.
The main reason for secondhand sales of many types of information goods differs from that of other types of goods.
Information goods often decline in value to their owners, precisely because they own them. Owner-specific deprecia-
tion is rarely incorporated in secondhand good models, but the concept dates far back, as evidenced by the following
quote from Adam Smith in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments":
"When we have read a book or poem so often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it
by ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion. To him it has all the graces of
novelty; we enter into the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him, but which it is no
longer capable of exciting in us."
Owner-specific depreciation is also a trait of many non-entertainment information goods. For example, language
learning software becomes less valuable to owners as they learn the language, and datasets become less valuable to
researchers after they have applied them to specific research projects.
The presence of owner-specific depreciation coupled with perfect durability, another common trait of information
goods, has important ramifications for firms. Even if firms can commit to maintaining prices or constraining output in
later periods, a portion of residual demand is satisfied by used goods, which are just as good a new ones. Hence, prices
1The first-sale doctrine dates back to an 1854 Supreme Court case, Stevens v. Royal Gladding, which ruled that a cartographer’s right to sole
distribution ended at first sale. It was subsequently codified in 1909, and updated in 1976. While it does not technically apply to licensed goods, a
U.S. District Court case, Vernor v. Autodesk (2009), ruled that goods that are licensed but not required to be returned constitute sales, and hence
are covered under the first-sale doctrine. In the Balance Act of 2003, Congress considered instituting a digital first-sale doctrine, allowing transfer
via the "forward and delete" resale method. But, the bill did not pass. For more see Graham (2002), Hinkes (2007), Long (2008), and Seringhaus
(2009).
2See Long (2008) and Hinkes (2007).
3The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998) criminalized the making and/or selling of technology capable of circumventing access controls,
limiting their availability. See: http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. Accessed April 28, 2010.
4Total expenditures (in billions) in the U.S., subject to rounding errors, equals: $40.3 (Books) + $22.4 (DVD) + $21 (Video Games) + $5.0
(Music) = $87.7. Sales figures were taken from the following sources:
Rich (2009), Hurt (2009),
DEG. “Digital Entertainment Group Year-End 2008 Home Entertainment Sales Figures,” http://www.dvdinformation.com/News/press/CES2009yearEnd.htm.
accessed June 5, 2009,
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry. “Recorded Music Sales 2008,” http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/Recorded-Music-Sales-
2008.pdf. Accessed June 5, 2009.
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naturally decline over time. This introduce an incentive compatibility constraint. Consumers may not be willing to
pay a high price now knowing the good will be available later at a lower price.
Resale may alternatively benefit firms when marginal cost is positive, because the same stream of services can be
supplied with fewer goods, and hence at lower cost, since goods are transferred from individuals that no longer have
much value for the product to those who do. But, even if firms preferred resale be allowed when information goods
are distributed via physical copies, they will probably not once goods are distributed digitally, at near-zero marginal
cost. Thus, firms will likely curtail resale of digitally distributed goods if allowed
By contrast, the impact of allowed resale on consumers of information goods is ambiguous. All else equal, resale
can only make consumers better off, because consumers can decide whether or not to resell products. But, the firm’s
reaction to resale markets, curtailing output in early periods, could make consumers worse off, since early purchasers
end up paying more, and those that delay buying discount gratification.
Whether resale markets benefit consumer, and the extent to which prohibited resale benefits firms, are thus empirical
questions. In this paper, I attempt to answer these question empirically in one market, the market for console video
games.
When resale markets for these types of goods exist, consumers face two decisions, when to buy and when to sell.
Since prices typically decline in these markets, buying later has the advantage of paying less for the product, but also
discounts utility derived from it. Individuals with higher valuation for quality are hurt more by discounting, and thus
typically buy sooner. After purchase, individuals must decide when to sell. They balance the benefits of keeping the
product and continuing to derive utility from use and the benefits of selling the product immediately, likely at a higher
price than in subsequent periods. If goods depreciate quickly to owners, selling sooner becomes more attractive, and
goods will likely change hands rapidly resulting in a very active market for secondhand goods.
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of allowed resale in one product context, video games, using
a novel data containing information on new and secondhand sales and prices for XBOX 360 video games. No suitable
natural experiment exists, so a structural model is employed. Since consumer behavior is inherently dynamic in this
context, I develop a dynamic discrete choice model similar to the models in Nair (2007) Gowrisankaran and Rysman
(2010), and Schiraldi (2010). First, the demand parameters are estimated from the data. The demand parameters
include the rate of owner-specific depreciation, which is identified by the level and timing of used product sales, and
typical demand parameters such as the extent of heterogeneity in initial valuations for quality and price sensitivity,
which are identified by prices and purchases. Once the demand parameters are known, optimal firm prices can be
computed under different legal environments. The impact of allowed, as opposed to prohibited, resale on consumers
and producers can then by analyzed.
2 Data
2.1 Data Description
The dataset used in this paper combines data from NPD on retail quantities and revenues of new copies of XBOX 360
games, by game and month, with the same data for a sample of used games, from an online auction site. The data
also includes several time-invariant game characteristics provided by NPD, and Game Informer magazine’s "replay
value" score, an inverse measure of rate of boredom, for a subset of games. The data span from November 2005, the
month the XBOX 360 was released, through December 2008, and include nearly all XBOX 360 games released in that
interval.5 Since the NPD data approximate the market, while the usable online auction data only includes a minority
share of used game sales, the used sales data must be appropriately scaled up to be of use. Based on industry statistics,
I scale up the secondhand sales by a factor of forty.
Intuitively, the main empirical model uses price and quantity trends, and deviations from those trends, for estimation.
Summary statistics for those trends are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that new sales decline with the age of the game, though used sales initially increase with the age of the
game, peaking in the fifth month. These trends support the contention that boredom, rather than realization of the
5For consistency, I drop all games released less than one year before the last period in the dataset.
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quality of an experience good, are driving used sales. One would expecte that the experience good explanation would
alternatively result in used game sales in a month being proportional to total sales in the previous month, which would
imply that used sales would decrease in age from the second month onwards, which clearly does not happen. By
the end of the first year, monthly used sales approximately equal monthly new sales, and at the end of the first year,
cumulative used sales account for nearly 20% of cumulative total sales of a game, used and new.
Table 1 also shows that prices typically decline rapidly from an initial price of around $55. By the end of the first year,
prices have fallen by half. The average difference by game age between new and used prices ranges from about $15 to
about $22. I learned from talking with employees at brick and mortar stores that these stores typically buy used copies
from players at around the same price, i.e. $20 less than the new price. The fact that stores then sell functioning used
copies for about $5 less than new copies supports the contention that used copies are near perfect substitutes for new
copies. On auction sites, the price difference between new and used games is related to transactions costs, such as
shipping fees, which are not included, and the risk of being defrauded. I will assume in my model that the used price
equals the new price less $18.50. Deviations from this difference will be accounted for in the model by a transaction
cost shock, explained later.
Sales of new and used good, given prices, are informative of the flow utility parameters and heterogeneity of valuations.
The timing of purchases is informative of the distribution of valuations for the game. Secondhand game prices decline
quickest at the onset eventually plateau, implying that, all else equal, it costs more to buy a game soon after release
than later in the game’s lifecylce. Individuals purchasing the product in the first period must have valued the product
high enough that buying and using the product immediately provided a higher expected value than buying in a later
period, despite the higher cost. An individual that bought in, say, the fifth month, but could have bought earlier, had
a value for the product high enough to buy then, rather than wait, but not high enough to buy earlier. A series of
inequalities following this reasoning determine the distribution of heterogeneity.
The timing and amount of used sales, relative to total purchases, explain the rate of owner-specific depreciation. The
faster a consumer lowers their valuation for the product, the faster they will want to resell the item, and the faster will
aggregate secondhand sales increase. Similarly, the extent by which a product depreciates to owners determines the
number of individuals that would ever be willing to resell the product.
Take, for example, the game "Transformers." The quantity and price paths are shown in Figure 1. Notice that the
number of games sold in the first month is an order of magnitude higher than the games sold monthly a few months
later. This implies that many individuals valued the game high enough to purchase immediately, rather than wait for
prices to fall. But not all were willing to. Some, though fewer, preferred to wait a few months, until the price had
dropped a moderate amount, while others preferred to wait much longer, until price had substantially declined. If the
extent of heterogeneity in valuations was large, we would see the share of non-owners buying decline over time, even
though price was falling. In this case, high valuation consumers exit the pool of potential buyers early on, leaving a
disproportionate number of individuals with low valuation for the product. Even though these individuals are more
likely to buy than they were in earlier periods with higher price, they are less likely to buy than the high valuation
types, and so the share buying can decrease. If valuations were homogenous, or the heterogeneity in valuations was
small, the opposite should happen.
The secondhand sales data seem to imply that individuals grow tired of the product fairly quickly, though not enough
to make most early buyers resell the good. Notice that the most purchases occur in the first month, and secondhand
sales peak around the 5th month. It seems likely that many of the large group of first period buyers are selling in the
fifth month. But secondhand sales never approach the total sales levels in the first few months, suggesting that many
early buyers never decide to resell. The model explained in the next section uses such data for multiple games to
determine the rate of owner-specific depreciation.
2.2 Price Process
The empirical model will require the consumers’ expectations of future prices given current information. It is impor-
tant to make the distinction between information relevant for future prices and information observable to consumers.
There are some types of information, such as sales history and market size, which are relevant to firms’ pricing deci-
sions, but are unobserved to individuals, and therefore cannot be accounted for in their expectations. Consumers can,
though, base their expectations on readily observable information such as current and past prices, and game charac-
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teristics like critic review scores and game genre. Below, I explicitly examine which types of information in my data
observable to consumers affect future prices.
To test which observables impact future prices, I estimate a autoregression of price on lagged prices and game observ-
ables. Specifically, I run regressions of the form:
Pj;t = + 1Pj;t 1 + :::+ mPj;t m + game_characteristicsj + "j;t (1)
The results are shown in the table 2.
The regressions show that the previous period price is a strong predictor of current period price, but the twice lagged
price does not significantly add to the regression. The R-squared value shows lagged price accounts for over 90 percent
of the variation in prices. Additionally, there is no evidence of autoregressive disturbances. The correlation between
residuals and lagged residuals from the preferred regression (number 4) is negative, not economically meaningful,
and insignificant. This is a nice result, as it allows the use of the standard first order Markov transition process in the
model. It is also apparent that the highest quality games have a different price trend than other games.
3 Model
The empirical model uses observed total quantities bought, secondhand goods sold, and prices each period by product
to estimate the model parameters. The consumers are explicitly modeled, and the firm’s pricing function is approxi-
mated as a first order Markov process. Many static models include a more formal supply side to increase estimation
precision, but this can introduce bias if the supply side is incorrectly modeled, and in many dynamic models, including
this one, unreasonably increases computation time.
While the empirical model of demand is somewhat complicated, the underlying behavior of agents in the model can
be explained simply. Each product is considered a separate market, and individuals enter as non-owners. At the
beginning of each period, non-owners choose between buying a copy of product j and waiting to buy. They consider
both the current and future payoffs, and choose the option that maximizes expected discounted utility. Since used
copies are assumed to be perfect substitutes for new ones, consumers do not explicitly choose between new and used
goods. Rather they make the binary decision of whether or not to buy a copy of product j that period. After they buy
product j, they become owners, and in subsequent periods choose between continuing to own and selling. Once they
sell, they are assumed to exit the market permanently. Consumers thus face a double optimal stopping problem.
In the rest of the section, I explain the empirical model by breaking it into sequential parts.
3.1 Flow Utility
Let i, j, and t respectively denote individual, product, and time period. The mean flow utilities of waiting to buy,
buying, continuing to own, and selling are given below.
uwait = !
ubuy (i;j;t; Pj;t) = i;j;t   Pj;t
uown (i;j;t; h) = i;j;tB (h)
usell
 
P usedj;t ; j;t

= 25 + P usedj;t + j;t
(2)
Additionally, possessing the product entails an individual specific utility shock "i;j;t, and not possessing the product,
i.e. the outside good, entails an individuals specific utility shock "i;0;t. These shocks are assumed to follow the type
1 extreme value distribution.
The mean flow utility of waiting !, or equivalently not owning product j, is normalized to a number much greater
than zero. Most papers normalize the outside good to zero, which can result in negative values of . While in most
papers this is inconsequential, in this model the sign of  determines whether  being multiplied by a value less than
1 (i.e. B (h)) raises or lower the utility received from the product relative to when  is not multiplied by B (h). The
Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 5
Economics and Value of Information Systems
specific value of ! does not matter, so long as all  remain positive. The mean flow utility of buying equals the
"intrinsic" utility of product j to individual i in period t, denoted by i;j;t, minus the product of the price sensitivity
coefficient () and price (Pj;t). In subsequent periods, the mean flow utility of ownership equals the intrinsic flow
utility multiplied by B (h), a function that reflects the decrease in value due to length of previous ownership (h). To
reduce the parameter space, I parameterizeB (h)with the function exp ( h), where  is a parameter. The mean flow
utility of selling equals the used selling price (P usedj;t ) times , plus a product and time specific transaction cost shock
(j;t) common across individuals. In the data section, the used price was determined to average the new price less
approximately $18.50. I assume this exact functional relationship between the two prices, and allow j;t to account
for deviations. The transaction cost shocks (j;t) reflect mean transaction cost shocks, for instance due to differences
between the perceived (by non-owners) and realized quality of the product.
3.2 Value Functions
The value functions give the expected maximum discounted utility for an individual, given the value of the state
variables. The expected value of the value functions in the next period, conditional on current decisions, are crucial
in the consumer’s decision-making process, and are needed in the policy functions.
The non-substitutability of video games implies that the ownership state variable is binary, and hence the value function
can be broken into two "alternative specific" value functions, one for owning and one for not owning. Because
individuals are assumed to purchase a good at most once, the value function of ownership is independent of the value
function of non-ownership. But the opposite is not true. For this reason, I start with the value function of ownership.
Note that the future expected value of the outside good after selling, given by VSold (t), simply equals
XP
x=1
 
'x 1  !,
where ' is the discount factor and X is total number of future periods considered.6 The value function of ownership
is given by the following Bellman equation:
VO
 
SOt

=
max
 
uown (i;j;t; h) + "i;j;t + 'E

VO
 
SOt+1

;
 
usell
 
P usedj;t ; j;t

+ VSold (t) + "i;0;t
	 (3)
where SO is the set of state variables
 
i;j;t; Pj;t; h; t; j;t; "i;j;t; "i;0;t

, and:
E

VO
 
SOt+1

=
Z
SOt+1
VO
 
SOt+1

f
 
SOt+1jSOt

@SOt+1 (4)
Implementation requires specification of the state variables’ Markovian transition processes. I assume that i;j;t is a
martingale sequence of form:
i;j;t+1 = i;j;t + j;t+1 (5)
The random walk assumption on j;t will be useful for estimation, as it speeds computation by allowing the same
value function to be used across products and by obviating the need for product fixed effects (Lee, 2010a). Pj;t is a
submartingale defined by:
Pj;t+1 = Pj;t + j;t+1 (6)
where  equals 0:955 (see data section), and j;t and j;;t are distributed bivariate normal with zero means and nonzero
correlation. The state variables h and t evolve deterministically.
Following Rust (1987) we can reduce the number of state variables and eliminate troublesome unobserved states by
integrating over state variables that do not provide any additional information on the likelihood of future states beyond
6X gives the total number of future periods where the consumer can use the product if keeping it. Future periods beyond X are not relevant to
this decision.
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what is captured by other state variables. I assume that "i;j;t, "i;0;t, and j;t abide. The terms "i;j;t and "i;0;t can
be integrated numerically, assuming they follow the type 1 extreme value distribution with location parameter equal
to the negative of Euler’s constant and scale parameter equal to one.7 Following these steps, the "expected" value
function can be written as the following Bellman equation:
WO (i;j;t; Pj;t; h; t) =Z
j
ln

exp
 
uown (i;j;t; h) + 'E

WNextO

+ exp
 
usell
 
P usedj;t ; j;t

+ VSold (t)
	
f
 
j;t

@j;t (7)
where,
E

WNextO

=R
i;j;t+1
R
Pj;t+1
WO (i;j;t+1; Pj;t+1; h+ 1; t+ 1) f (i;j;t+1; Pj;t+1ji;j;t; Pj;t) @Pj;t+1@i;j;t+1 (8)
Following the same assumptions, the "expected" value function of non-ownership can be written as:
WNO (i;j ; Pj ; t) = ln

exp
 
ubuy (i;j ; Pj) + 'E

WNextO

+ exp
 
uwait + 'E

WNextNO
	 (9)
where, if buying, the next value of h equals 1, and:
E

WNextNO

=R
i;j;t+1
R
Pj;t+1
WNO (i;j;t+1; Pj;t+1; t+ 1) f (i;j;t+1; Pj;t+1ji;j;t; Pj;t) @Pj;t+1@i;j;t+1 (10)
3.3 Policy Functions and the Probability of Buying and Selling
This section presents the formulas for the probability that an individual of a given discrete type makes a given decision,
conditional on ownership status. While there are several state variables, each individual in each period only faces one
decision. Non-owners choose between buying the product and waiting until the next period. Owners can hold onto
the product or sell the product.
By the Principal of Optimality, a non-owner will buy product j if the expected discounted utility of buying exceeds
the expected discount of utility of waiting. Specifically, the buying decision is given by:
I (Buy) =
 
ubuy (i;j;t; Pj;t) + 'E

WNextO

+ "i;j;t > uwait + 'E

WNextNO

+ "i;0;t
 (11)
Given that the error terms " follow the type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability of non-owner i buying, given
that he/she does not own the product, can be written analytically as:
Pr (buyji;j;t; Pj;t; t) =
exp
 
ubuy (i;j;t; Pj;t) + 'E

WNextO

exp
 
ubuy (i;j;t; Pj;t) + 'E

WNextO

+ exp
 
uwait + 'E

WNextNO
 (12)
And, similarly, the probability of owner i selling, conditional on owning the product, is given by:
Pr
 
sellji;j;t; Pj;t; h; j;t; t

=
exp
 
usell
 
P usedj;t ; j;t

+ VSold (t)

exp
 
usell
 
P usedj;t ; j;t

+ VSold (t)

+ exp
 
uown (i;j;t; h) + 'E

WNextO
 (13)
7When "1 and "2 follow the type 1 extreme value distribution with location parameter equal to the negative of Euler’s constant, and scale
parameter equal to one: E [max (A+ "1; B + "2)] = ln
 
eA + eB

. See Rust (1987), equation 4.12.
Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 7
Economics and Value of Information Systems
4 Estimation
4.1 Recovering Error Terms
This subsection explains how the price, demand, and transaction cost shocks are calculated from the observed data
and a set of parameter values. The price shocks (j;t) are calculated ex-ante using only the data on prices, and do not
depend on the parameter estimates. The rest are calculated within the model. The demand shocks () are computed
sequentially using the contraction mapping of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), henceforth denoted BLP. For each
product j and period t beyond the first, the value of j;t is calculated by approximately equalizing the observed and
model’s predicted share of non-owners buying . Then, given the resulting value of j;t, the masses of non-owners
of each discrete type for the product are updated for the next period to reflect exiters (i.e. buyers) and entrants (i.e.
new console owner). The transaction cost shocks (j;t), which depend on the quality level and hence on the demand
shocks (j;t), are also computed sequentially using the BLP contraction. For each product in each period beyond the
first, the value of j;t is calculated by equalizing observed share of owners selling with predicted share selling, and
the masses of owners of each type in the next period are updated to reflect entrants (new buyers) and exiters (sellers).
Details are provided below.
4.2 Controlling for Endogeneity
Following Nair (2007) and Villas-Boas and Winer (1999), I estimate a simultaneous equation system where the si-
multaneity appears only in the demand equation, lagged price is excluded from the demand equation, and the pricing
equation is well-approximated by a regression of current price on lagged price. The shocks  and  are assumed to be
distributed bivariate normal with correlation to be estimated.
The frequently used BLP method is not feasible in this context since it requires having at least as many instruments
as coefficients. The only variables varying across markets in this dataset are prices, quantities (new and used), and
number and age of other goods. Typical instruments constructed from these variables are not strong in this context.
Market concentration measures cannot be used, since games have been shown empirically not to be substitutable for
each other, and cost-shifters are ruled out, since the marginal cost of video games, and more generally information
goods, are close to zero.
4.3 Objective Function
The likelihood function is given by:
L (data; parameters) = L
 
Pj;t; Q
new
j;t ; Q
used
j;t ;; ; ; ; ;  ; ;
 (14)
where  determines the of owner-specific depreciation,  is the price sensitivity,  and  are the mean group utility
difference and fraction of high types,  and  are the standard deviations of  and , and ; is the correlation
between  and . After a change of variables transformation, the likelihood can be written in terms of the shocks, as:
L
 
j;t; j;tj;t; parameters

=
Y
f
 
j;t; j;t

f
 
j;t
 jjJ jj (15)
where jjJ jj is the Jacobian determinant. The derivation of the Jacobian is available from the author.
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Table 1 - Price and Quantities Patterns over Time
Age (in Months) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1 22.1 12.8 0.3 0.5 56.3 8.8 40.0 8.0
2 17.4 9.7 1.3 0.8 54.8 8.3 35.7 8.0
3 9.2 6.7 1.6 0.9 53.5 8.9 31.6 8.0
4 7.7 5.9 1.8 0.9 50.9 10.9 28.5 7.5
5 5.0 2.8 2.1 1.0 47.5 11.4 25.4 7.4
6 4.4 3.2 1.8 0.8 43.7 12.7 23.1 7.0
7 4.0 4.6 1.7 0.7 40.9 12.7 21.1 7.1
8 3.2 3.1 1.6 0.7 38.3 12.3 19.2 6.8
9 2.7 2.0 1.5 0.6 35.2 12.2 17.8 6.8
10 2.8 2.9 1.4 0.6 32.8 11.5 16.6 6.7
11 2.2 1.8 1.4 0.5 30.9 11.4 15.5 6.8
12 1.9 1.7 1.3 0.6 28.6 10.3 14.5 6.2
*normalized by total sales, used and new, in first 12 months
New Used New Used
Quantity (normalized*) Price
Table 2 - Price Path Regressions
1 2 3 4 5 6
P(t-1) 0.962 0.96 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.95
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
P(t-2) -0.006
(0.769)
2nd Critic Quintile -0.157 -0.135 -0.162 -0.162
(0.623) (0.670) (0.634) (0.615)
3rd Critic Quintile -0.107 -0.106 -0.178 -0.106
(0.747) (0.749) (0.601) (0.760)
4th Critic Quintile 0.084 0.093 0.055 0.159
(0.796) (0.773) (0.869) (0.633)
5th (Highest) Critic Quintile 1.058 1.063 0.946 1.075
(0.004)** (0.003)** (0.013)* (0.005)**
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Release Month Yes
(0.920)
Genre Yes
(0.584)
Constant -0.801 -0.587 -0.625 -0.557 -0.933 -0.489
(0.008)** (0.080)* (0.073)* (0.255) (0.228) (0.346)
Observations 2423 2202 2346 2346 2313 2346
R-squared 0.906 0.901 0.906 0.908 0.908 0.908
Dependent variable is price
P-values in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level. ** denotes significance at 5% level. Regression includes prices in first 12 months for XBOX 360 games released prior to December, 2007 (i.e. games with at least 12 months
in dataset).
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